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ABSTRACT 
 
  The parliament of 1621 witnessed extensive debating of economic issues by those engaged in 
finding solutions for the exacting crisis which then affected England. These proceedings offer the 
background against which some of the most relevant economic literature of the period was produced. 
As  debates  progressed, two  contrasting  perspectives  gradually  emerged.  One of  them  argued  that 
monetary imbalances were responsible for bullion outflows and sluggish economic activity, while the 
other believed that monetary flows were ultimately caused by an unfavorable balance of trade. These 
were exactly the same issues at stake in the controversy between Malynes and Misselden in the early 
1620’s, to which Mun would provide a solution with his strict adherence to the balance of trade. Thus, 
through an analysis of economic debates in the 1621 parliament, this paper seeks to offer an essential 
element for understanding early XVII century British economic reasoning. 
 





  O parlamento de 1621 testemunhou longos debates acerca de questões econômicas por parte 
daqueles empenhados em encontrar soluções para a severa crise que então afligia a Inglaterra. Estas 
atividades parlamentares constituem o pano de fundo contra o qual parte da literatura econômica mais 
relevante do período foi produzida. À medida que os debates avançavam, duas perspectivas opostas 
gradualmente emergiram. Uma delas defendia que desequílibrios monetários eram os responsáveis 
pela  fuga  de  metais  e  pela  estagnação  econômica,  enquanto  a  outra  argumentava  que  fluxos 
monetários eram determinados, em última instância, por uma balança comercial desfavorável. Estes 
eram precisamente os mesmos tópicos em questão na controvérsia entre Malynes e Misselden no 
começo da década de 1620, para a qual Mun encontraria uma solução aderindo de forma estrita à 
balança  comercial.  Assim,  por  meio  da  análise  dos  debates  econômicos  ocorridos  durante  o 
parlamento de 1621, este artigo procura oferecer alguns elementos cruciais para a compreensão das 
idéias econômicas na Inglaterra do início do século XVII. 
 
Key words: economia pré-clássica; mercantilismo; século XVII; Inglaterra Stuart; Thomas Mun.    
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INTRODUCTION 
 
In the midst of all the political mayhem that characterized early Stuart England, economic 
turbulences  and  difficulties  are  frequently  somehow  cast  in  a  shadow.  Those  were  present, 
nonetheless, and they were an essential component in the process of social change that swiftly took 
hold of England during those decades. James’ economic heritage upon his accession was a dubious 
one,  to  say  the  least.  The  protracted  period  of  demanding  foreign  conflicts  which  characterized 
Elizabeth’s late reign exerted its toll upon the country’s wealth, besides leading to growing popular 
discontent due to frequent fiscal exactions in order to support the war effort. Foreign trade was on the 
whole sluggish, leading one eminent historian to reach the bleak conclusion that “the last years of 
Elizabeth’s reign were marked neither by security in the organization of trade nor by any degree of 
commercial progress” (Supple, 1964, p. 25). Such was the legacy bequeathed by the “late Queen of 
famous memory” to her Scottish successor. 
Nevertheless,  the  new  dynasty  took  its  first  steps  on  an  economic  high  note.  James’ 
accession  in  1603  brought  along  peace  with  Spain,  and  with  it  a  general  improvement  in  trade 
conditions. The first decade of his reign was one of undoubted prosperity – a golden era which would 
be bitterly remembered both by opponents and allies during the hard years to come. White broadcloth 
exports grew constantly, reaching its highest ever level in 1614. Prices were on the rise, as were rents. 
On this bed of roses, however, lay a cumbersome monarch, and all the affluence was not translated 
into solid public policy. The bounty and extravagance so characteristic of James’ style of governance 
guaranteed that the reduction in extraordinary expenses resulting from peace did not bring about an 
equivalent loosening of pressure on the crown’s budget. Quite on the contrary, ordinary expenses 
soared, and the king and his councilors soon had to face a quickly deteriorating fiscal situation – an 
issue which would haunt James unmercifully throughout the remainder of his reign, as well as that of 
his heir
1. 
Of course, James’ “Christmas” was only part of the story. Beneath the glowing surface of 
economic life lay profound changes which were then taking place within England’s main industry. Sir 
Edward Coke often repeated that nine out of ten parts of England’s exportable commodities came 
from the sheep’s back. That might as well be, but the possibilities offered by the sheep’s back were 
numerous. Early seventeenth century witnessed a dual movement within British woolen cloth industry: 
the decay of the traditional, luxurious white and undressed woolen cloth – “the jewel of the kingdom” 
– and the rise of the lighter and coarser mixed fabrics collectively known as new draperies. This 
process was already in course during the first decade of the century, and was still to go on for much 
longer
2. However, an unhappy attempt at government interference – the infamous Cockayne project
3 – 
brought about a precipitous decline in the traditional sector. White broadcloth exports peaked in 1614, 
never to reach the same level again. From 1615 to 1618, when the project was being put into practice, 
                                                 
1 Regarding early Stuart fiscal hardships and the means through which they were dealt with, see Ashton (1957 & 1960). 
2 About the changing patterns of England’s foreign trade in late XVI and early XVII century see Davis (1961), Fisher (1950) 
and Wilson (1969). 
3  An  extensive,  although  somehow  outdated,  account  of  all  the  social,  political,  and  economic  circumstances  which 
surrounded the rise and fall of the Cockayne project can be found in Friis (1927). Barry Supple also deals with the subject 
from an updated perspective (1964, pp. 31-49).    
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this whole branch of cloth manufacture faced constant and severe distress. Although going through a 
secular decline, white broadcloths were still the main export item for England, and such a disruption in 
its trade was bound to have strong economic implications for the country as a whole. Moreover, after 
the project was finally repealed, and everything was expected to go back to normality, a new series of 
disturbances hit England’s cloth trade badly. Those were related to the beginning of hostilities in 
Central Europe, and the severe monetary disturbances that ensued
4. Not having time to fully recover 
from one major setback, England’s cloth trade found itself once again plunged into depression. 
Thus, by the dawn of the 1620’s England’s economic prospects did not seem nearly as bright 
as they had a decade or so before. It was under these circumstances that an indebted king was forced to 
summon  parliament  in  1621  in  order  to  meet  the  challenges  posed  by  religious  conflicts  on  the 
continent. That would be the first time the Commons met after the dismal events which led to the 
dissolution of the Addled Parliament in 1614. All the abovementioned pressing economic distresses 
accumulated  during  those  seven  years  were  bound  to  appear  in  the  forum  for  debate  offered  in 
Westminster. And appear they did, under several guises. The 1621 parliament brought a whole array 
of economic issues into public scrutiny, and forced different groups and sectors of society to reflect 
about them and voice their opinions. One of the results thereof was a burst of activity in economic 
pamphleteering.  The  most  significant  economic  tracts  conceived  during  the  first  half  of  the 
seventeenth century were directly related to the early 1620’s economic disturbances and their public 
investigation originally induced in the 1621 parliament. The notorious controversy between Gerard de 
Malynes and Edward Misselden covered the span of four pamphlets published between 1622 and 
1623, dealing in detail with issues debated in parliament
5. The same with Thomas Mun, who not only 
composed  a  tract  aimed  directly  at  influencing  1621  proceedings,  but  was  an  active  member  of 
investigative  committees  then  established.  Such  experience served  as the  basis  for the  writing  of 
England’s Treasure by Foraign Trade, the definitive masterpiece of early Stuart economic reasoning. 
Thus, understanding what is at stake in the House of Commons during 1621 is a fundamental step 
towards acquiring a firm grasp of early seventeenth century economic ideas in England. Such is the 
aim of the following pages. 
 
 
THE 1621 PARLIAMENT AND ECONOMIC DEBATES 
 
Economic  issues  undoubtedly  occupied  a  prominent  place  amidst  1621  parliamentary 
proceedings.  Such  eminence,  however,  cannot  be  exaggerated.  Other  subjects  ruled  the  day  and 
gathered much more attention: the Palatinate crisis and related revenue subsidies; non-conformity 
policies; patents of monopoly and law dispensation; the punishment of officers there involved, in 
particular Lord Chancellor Bacon; legal reforms in the courts of chancery and wards. Of these, only 
monopolies  had  in  any  sense  an  economic  underpinning,  although  the  whole  matter  was  deeply 
entangled  in  political  and  constitutional  issues.  Still,  economic  concerns  were  present  in  a  quite 
                                                 
4 The standard account of the crisis is still that of Barry Supple (1964). See also Kindleberger (1991). 
5 The pamphlets directly concerned with this post-parliament controversy are Free trade or the meanes to make trade flourish 
and The circle of commerce or the balance of trade, by Misselden, and The center of the circle of commerce, by Malynes, 
although earlier works by the latter were frequently drawn into the discussion.    
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straightforward fashion during the whole session, from its very beginning. As proof of that, one can 
adduce James’ own words in his opening address to parliament: 
 
For the scarcitie of coine, it is strange that my Mint for silver hath not gone this nyne or ten 
years. Yea, so long it hath stood out of use that I and my council cannot think to see silver 
coined there againe in our time. How this may be redressed it concerneth you to consider 
now in Parliament and let your King have your best advice about it (CD, 1621, VI:371-2
6) 
 
The king’s concern over money was only natural, since that was one of the undisputed items 
in the royal prerogative. What is less obvious is that he would be willing to ask parliament for advice 
on  how  to  deal  with  monetary  shortcomings.  This  exchange  of  consultations  between  king  and 
parliament  regarding  economic-related  issues  would  be  a  constant  feature  of  the  whole  session, 
although very few policy measures actually ever came to fruition. As part of preparations for their 
early summer adjournment, the Commons decided to petition the king to consider of three subjects in 
particular during the recess: freedom of trade to the outports, scarcity of money and exportation of 
ordnance
7. The first two somehow encapsulated the main lines of economic debate in parliament 
during the preceding months. Regarding freedom of trade to the outports, a cautious James replied he 
found it a subject best suited for parliament to investigate
8. Even so, he promised to seek advice with 
the Privy Council about it, whereas soon-to-be Lord Treasurer Cranfield admonished members to go 
home assured that measures would be taken to remedy the situation even before they could reach their 
counties. As to the scarcity of money, James’ reply once again demonstrates his deep concern and 
involvement with the matter: 
 
For the second, which is want of coine, he [the king] said he thought no free Prince ever had 
his mint standing as his hath don so idle and so long idle. For, save a few Angels and some 
other few great and small peeces of gold, he cold heare of no mony from it a long time. And 
he said he often had put this mater to his council to be considered of, but cold not yet learne 
the reasons of that want nor heare of the remedy. Nevertheles the conclusion was that he 
wold take it againe into consideration and treade in the houses steppes as farre as he thought 
them fit to be followed (CD, 1621, VI:410) 
 
These were not empty political promises. When parliament met again in November, the king 
could proudly report that both issues had been properly dealt with: matters of trade had been much 
debated  and  were  “conveniently  established”,  whereas  matters  of  bullion  were  under  the  care  of 
people selected from both houses
9. The Privy Council had, indeed, been very active in this sphere 
during the previous months. As Cranfield had promised, the Merchant Adventurers were immediately 
forced to allow free exportation of new draperies by the outports to their privileged areas of Germany 
                                                 
6  The  standard  source  for  parliamentary  debates  used  in  this  paper  is  the  seven-volume  collection  edited  by  Wallace 
Notestein, Frances Helen Relf and Hartley Simpson, Commons Debates 1621, referred heretofore as “CD, 1621”. 
7 Cf. CD, 1621, II:417; III:404; IV:398-9. 
8 Cf. CD, 1621, IV:414; VI:410. 
9 Cf. CD, 1621, III:415-6.    
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and Low Countries
10. Following the king’s own personal recommendation, the Council set about to 
debate and redress economic grievances raised by parliament. Merchant companies were asked to 
report  in  writing  their  views  regarding  monetary  problems,  which  the  Council  subsequently 
examined
11. Representatives of the outports also were called in to present their opinions about the 
decay  of  trade  and  the scarcity  of  money,  and  a  committee  was then  appointed to  deal  with  the 
evidence
12. 
Economic topics thus were the subject of much care throughout the whole year of 1621. 
During the last month of proceedings, relations between king and parliament quickly deteriorated, and 
a whole new range of political issues took hold of the Commons. Even so, when it became clear that 
the session would end without the approval of most significant bills, one could often hear members 
regretting that so little had been done for the relief of the kingdom’s trade. Given that so much thought 
and speech were dedicated to assorted economic concerns, it is legitimate to ask in what exactly 
consisted these concerns, and how they were approached by different voices in parliament. 
 
 
MONEY AND TRADE IN PARLIAMENT 
 
By 1621, England’s cloth trade had been facing depressed conditions for almost a decade, 
during which time traditional clothing districts constantly petitioned the Privy Council seeking redress. 
Such  complaints  kept  on  arriving  in  1619  and  1620,  making  it  clear  that  simply  getting  rid  of 
Alderman  Cockayne  and  his  dyeing  and  dressing  project  would  not  restore  trade  to  its  former 
condition. However, when parliament first met, the king explicitly stated his concern with money, and 
it was from this standpoint that economic debates initially took place. Indeed, one of the striking 
features of these proceedings is that, for some time, decay of cloth trade and scarcity of money are 
roughly treated as distinct issues. When economic themes were approached for the first time, on 
February 6, John Glanville took the lead and suggested the following reasons for the scarcity of 
money: exportation of money due to a value imbalance between domestic and foreign currencies; 
melting of coin into plate; excessive consumption of foreign goods; and the East India Company silver 
exports
13. Of these, only the last two are related in any way to foreign trade, and even so without any 
apparent connection to the cloth trade. The next major issue brought about as a possible cause was the 
gold and silver thread patent, which allegedly both forbid bullion imports and implied consumption of 
domestic stocks
14. This line of reasoning, opened up by Sir William Spencer and Edward Alford, was 
tied  from  the  beginning with larger  political  issues,  and  would later  be  pursued  at length  during 
proceedings against monopoly patents and corrupt referees
15. Scarcity of money debates were then 
                                                 
10 Acts of the Privy Council, V:391-2. 
11 A.P.C., V:393, 400. 
12 A.P.C., VI:40;71. 
13 Cf. CD, 1621, II:29-30; IV:19; V:3-4, 439-40. 
14 Cf. CD, 1621, II:30; IV:19-20; V:440. 
15 Cf. CD, 1621, IV:127; Commons Journals, I:537-44. The gold and silver thread patent, which granted sole rights of 
domestic  manufacturing  while  at  the  same  time  forbidding  importation,  was  one  of  several  patents,  considered  by 
parliament to be grievances, through which a case was built against scandalous projectors and corrupt officers involved as 
referees in the granting of such patents – among whom were Lord Chancellor Francis Bacon and former Attorney-General 
Sir Henry Yelverton. There are strong evidences that even this initial attack was already part of a concerted effort to bring 
down those involved. Cf. CD, 1621, IV:19-20.    
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conferred upon the Committee for Grievances, with specific orders for the East India Company to 
attend, and the gold and silver thread patent to be brought in for investigation. Moreover, upon a 
motion by Sir Edward Sackville, it was suggested that the patent’s referees should be examined, “so 
that His Majesty’s Justice might be freed” (CD, 1621, V:439-40). Thus, monetary issues were tangled 
from the beginning with other political agendas, being used to reinforce the constitutional case against 
monopoly patents. The same pattern would come up again and again during the remainder of the 
session. 
Ironically enough, the only voice to relate scarcity of money directly to the cloth trade during 
these initial discussions was that of Sir Giles Mompesson – who was involved with the gold and silver 
patent, and would be the first victim of the monopoly cleansing proceedings. Certainly trying to shift 
focus from the patent, he argued that: 
 
the Merchant Adventurers who trade into those parts whence gold and silver hath been 
brought may be examined whether the gold which they bring be not again transported. For it 
is a general opinion that any kingdom that is rich in staple commodities must needs be rich, 
and therefore that it be examined whether those the commodities do not want vent or hold 
not the price they were wont; if so, then there must needs be want of coin (CD, 1621, II:31) 
 
Mompesson thus not only presented a strictly balance-of-trade-oriented argument, but also 
linked eventual deficiencies with the state of the kingdom’s principal trade. This last issue was first 
brought to parliament’s attention on February 14, upon the reading of an act for free buying and 
selling of wool. The bill was directed at enhancing the domestic price of wool, considered by most to 
be much abated of late, but debates soon turned to the larger issue of the cloth trade decay in general. 
As it had happened the previous week, the matter was extensively analyzed with scant reference to the 
other  major  economic  grievance  under  examination  in  the  house.  In  his  parliamentary  diary,  Sir 
Thomas  Wentworth  offered  a  fairly  accurate  summary  of  related  proceedings,  reporting  six  main 
causes for the cloth trade decay: the price boycott by the Merchant Adventurers in an attempt to 
recover their expenses with the charter renewal; fraudulent bankrupts which did not settle their debts 
with  clothiers;  pretermitted  customs
16,  raising  the  price  of  cloth  in  foreign  markets;  trade 
disorganization  resulting  from  the  Cockayne  project;  exclusive  wool  buying  privileges  of  the 
Company of Staplers; and exports of raw wool to foreign markets, which enabled cloth manufacturing 
abroad (CD, 1621, V:456-8).  
These points were taken very seriously, and, contrary to what happened subsequently with 
money-related grievances, most of them eventually became the object of specific bills in parliament. 
Sir Edward Coke, after the standard Latin quotation, opened his speech saying that “this is one of the 
weightiest causes we can have” (CD, 1621, II:76). He suggested the matter were handed to a select 
committee, but other voices immediately rose to argue that, as it concerned the whole kingdom, it 
should be debated by a committee of the whole house
17. That was eventually what happened, with 
                                                 
16 The pretermitted customs were a highly polemical export tariff imposed by James on English cloth under the excuse that it 
merely compensated for the differential revenue which would be obtained with the wool was exported in its raw state and 
paid the due customs. 
17 Cf. CD, 1621, II:77; V:331.    
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instruction for both merchants and clothiers to attend and expose their views on the subject. The topics 
that  carry  more  heat  during  this  initial  assessment  are  undoubtedly  the  Merchant  Adventurers’ 
unsatisfactory performance and the damaging competitive effect imposed upon cloth by excessive 
tariffs. This last view is obviously adopted by the company’s partisans, and it is possible to identify 
two distinct and, to a great extent, opposed perspectives in play here.  
The fact that the pretermitted customs were opposed on grounds of their deleterious effect 
over cloth demand abroad is highly instructive for showing that part of the house’s members was 
acutely aware of competitive conditions in international cloth markets. Wentworth himself, in his 
speech  on  that  day,  expressed  the  point  clearly,  saying  that  with  the  increased  charge  of  the 
pretermitted customs “we cannot undersell other nations nowe as we were wont to doe” (CD, 1621, 
IV:49). His use of the expression “undersell” is enlightening, because it shows the problem to lie not 
in a possible absolute stoppage of foreign demand for woolen cloth; it lies, instead, in the possibility of 
foreign competitors supplying cloth in more favorable terms than England. That is not, as it might 
seem at first, a trivial statement. Some of the best minds of the period still thought of English white 
woolen cloth as some sort of immaculate, irreplaceable commodity. The logic corollary of such a 
view, from an early-seventeenth century perspective, is that the price of cloth should be kept as high as 
possible. The perception of elastic demand conditions in foreign markets, on the other hand, leads to 
the opposite conclusion: cloth should not be made more expensive, but cheaper. 
It would be unwise to impose such strict logical reasoning upon parliamentary speeches. The 
faith  in  a  regulated,  balanced  trade,  which  built  upon  competitive  advantages  by  keeping  prices 
adequately high in international markets, still held much appeal. Moreover, there are other, larger 
issues at stake on the matter of impositions. However, the example is useful for shedding light on the 
opposing views held at this point by clothiers and wool-growers, on one hand, and cloth merchants, on 
the other
18. The former group was in favor of relaxing the Adventurers’ restrictions on export activities 
– to consider “whether it be not fit to enlarge the number of those merchants or that it may be lawful to 
everyone to adventure his own cloth” (CD, 1621, II:78). Their stock-in-trade argument was the low 
price paid to the domestic clothier due to the small number and collusive practices of merchants. This 
is how the bill was originally framed, as an appeal to eliminating company restrictive practices so that 
a greater number of buyers would draw wool prices up; and several voices took the opportunity to 
reiterate the general desirability of keeping them that way. Coke even put it as a matter of precedent, 
stating that it was an established Common Law principle that “our own commodities should be kept at 
a great rate” (CD, 1621, II:76-7). Two days later the matter was taken up by the plenary committee, 
and there, once again, “it was laid as a ground, that when Woolls were dearest, then was this Kingdom 
the richest” (V:468). 
When the cloth trade decay was once again tackled on February 23, the subject was for the 
first time directly related to the scarcity of money. Even so, the mention is brief and does not gather 
much attention. Representatives from several clothing districts were called in to give their opinions on 
the  matter,  and  Somersetshire  reported,  along  with  four  other  causes,  “the  scarcitie  of  money, 
frequencie of Usurie” (CD, 1621, IV:97-8). The debate’s focus had now changed, taking the form of a 
                                                 
18 This division was not always, however, a clear-cut one. Partisans of the Merchant Adventurers could sometimes defend the 
company on the grounds that its organization was, in fact, an effective way to keep prices up. See page 18 below.    
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confrontation between clothiers and wool dealers. Despite their common antagonism to the Merchant 
Adventurers,  most  of  the  voices  speaking  on  the  clothiers’  behalf  accepted  the  argument  that 
impositions, through their effect on prices, were hindering cloth sales on foreign markets – which 
seems to demonstrate the argument’s inherent plausibility at the time. The traditional faith on the 
uniqueness of English cloth was relocated to the nation’s raw materials, and complaints generally 
followed two alternate lines: mixing and deceitful preparing of wools, which damaged the quality of 
domestically  produced  cloth;  and  exportation  of  raw  wool  and  fuller’s  earth,  permitting  the 
manufacture of high quality cloth abroad
19. The latter, in particular, would be a theme constantly 
pursued throughout the whole session. 
On the other economic front, scarcity of money debates gathered momentum once again a 
few days later. Apparently, the matter had lain still after initial proceedings, but Sir Edwin Sandys 
brought it back to the forefront on February 26, taking his cue from the king’s recommendation during 
the opening speech
20. The matter was discussed at length and finally referred to a committee of the 
whole house, which met for the first time already the following afternoon
21. At this point, decay of 
trade and scarcity of money first began to be treated as somehow interrelated issues, with several 
speeches adducing the former as a possible cause of the latter. Such mingling of both themes would 
proceed even further along March, so much so that, after the Easter adjournment, they were being 
jointly  referred  to  committee  investigation
22.  Still,  the  two  tribulations  continued  to  be  seen  as 
reasonably distinct, though connected, issues, as can be grasped from Sir Thomas Roe’s statement 
during preparations for the summer adjournment: 
 
Lett us doe sommwhat in matter of mony in this interim, but not in matter of trade. The one 
way for Bullion coming in, and prohibition of exportation; but trade depends on patents and 
Monopolies and askes long debate and it cannot now be determined (CD, 1621, III:371) 
 
Now, one might ask, why is it relevant that scarcity of money and the cloth trade crisis are 
treated as distinct issues in parliament? Is that not simply a matter of conceptual shortcomings? It is 
not the purpose of this paper to determine whether early XVII century economic ideas were in any 
sense  “right”  or  “wrong”.  However,  even in the  unlikely  case that this  distinction  arises,  indeed, 
entirely out of faulty reasoning, what makes it fundamental is that it provided what is arguably the 
single most important topic for debate in the 1620’s economic pamphlet literature. I have argued this 
point at length elsewhere
23, so it will not be dwelt on here. Suffice to say that the fierce controversy 
between Malynes and Misselden in the aftermath of parliament hinges on whether monetary flows or 
commodity flows ultimately determine the outcome of a nation’s foreign trade. Likewise, Thomas 
                                                 
19 Regarding this early confrontation between clothiers and wool-dealers, see CD, 1621, IV:95-8; V:468-9. 
20 Cf. CD, 1621, II:137; IV:104-5. 
21 Cf. CD, 1621, V:261, 524-5; VI:16. 
22 After some complaints about the lack of resolutions in the trade and money committees, on April 17, future proceedings 
were discussed: “Some are of opinion that, as the issues are varied, several sub-committees must be established; others, 
that the whole matter is one and the same issue, therefore more suitable to be debated in a committee of the whole house 
where everyone interested could speak” (CD, 1621, III:3-4). See also V:331.  
23 A more detailed assessment of theoretical and conceptual controversies within early Stuart economic literature can be 
found in Suprinyak (2007).    
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Mun’s greatest claim to fame with posterity lies in his unabashed faith in the primacy of the balance of 
trade – i.e., commodity flows – over monetary mechanisms. These issues, which virtually defined 
economic  reasoning  during  the  period,  were  brought  to  light  in  the  1621  parliament,  when  the 
Commons were trying to reconcile cloth trade depression and scarcity of money as interconnected 
economic problems. 
The immediate results of such attempts were dismal. Cranfield’s report, delivered on March 
13, about the proceedings in the committee for the decay of money listed more than twenty reasons for 
the  nation’s  economic  maladies
24.  Of  these,  approximately  half  were  directly  related  to  trade 
imbalances,  but  this  number  can  be  misleading,  for  several  of  them  were  simply  branch-specific 
versions of a general complaint against the “unequal balancing of trade” and excessive imports of 
foreign commodities. Four other topics dealt with monetary mechanisms which supposedly inhibited 
the inflow and/or stimulated the outflow of money, while a few others pointed to means whereas 
money  was  domestically  consumed  (melting  into  plate,  gold  and  silver thread  manufacture,  etc.). 
However, there was not any clearly established hierarchy among them, and such was to remain the 
case until the very end. 
Only one of the raised topics – excessive importation of Spanish tobacco – was immediately 
picked out for further debate, and its case illustrates both, on one hand, that much weight could be 
added to a given bill through the imputation of beneficial economic consequences, and on the other, 
how unlikely it was that abstractly formulated propositions would ever find their way into policy. The 
attack on Spanish tobacco was initiated by Sandys already during activities on February 26/27, when 
scarcity of money was approached systematically for the first time. Sandys, as a leading member of 
the Virginia Company, had an immediate interest in the tobacco trade, even more so because the 
whole branch was then currently under control of crown patentees who refused to buy Virginian 
tobacco. Sandys thus introduces the matter as soon as he can, although with a very carefully crafted 
strategy. Speaking towards the end of proceedings, Sandys proposes to summarize what had been 
formerly said under three headings: 1) lack of importation of money; 2) exportation of money; and 3) 
consumption and wasting within the land
25. It is hard to grasp, at first, why this rhetorical flourish 
should figure so prominently in his speech, especially since it is not pursued any further afterwards. 
However, under a more careful reading, it becomes apparent that, by adopting these categories, Sandys 
could then focus particularly on the first of them, and by so doing emphasize the point that American 
silver, the main international supply, was only accessible through Spain: 
 
Yf there were here Mynes of Gold and Silver, I showld then take care of exportacion; but 
being there are not, the cheifest poynte is Importacion. The Causes of want in respect of 
Importacion are theis: Spaine is the well-head for silver; And should the Lawe bee rigorous, 
yet soe long as they want the Commodityes of other Nation And have noe Commodityes to 
returne, their money must needs goe out (CD, 1621, IV:112-3) 
                                                 
24 Cf. CD, 1621, II:212-3; IV:149-50. 
25 Cf. CD, 1621, II:139; V:516; VI:16.    
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Trade with Spain should then be well managed so as to guarantee an influx of money. But it 
just so happened that this very branch of foreign trade, which in earlier times brought 100,000l. in 
money yearly to England, now brought tobacco instead – such a vain course that it prompted Spanish 
people, so the story went, to remark ironically, every time an English merchant vessel laden with 
commodities approached their shores, that they would have all that for smoke. The solution was to 
forbid tobacco imports from outside of his majesty’s domains, a measure which would, incidentally, 
give a much needed stimulus to the Virginia colony. Moreover, to turn trade with Spain even more to 
England’s advantage, Sandys proposed that fishing upon the Newfoundland coasts should be free to 
all English people – it was then restricted to those who had established plantations in the area. This 
fish was eagerly demanded in Spain, and would, therefore, bring more bullion to the nation. 
Sandys’  political  agenda  was  thus  set  out  from  the  beginning.  His  strategy  paid  off 
handsomely: Spanish tobacco was overwhelmingly decided to be a major factor behind the scarcity of 
money, and its prohibition was carried forcefully through parliament
26. Such result can be attributed to 
a highly favorable set of circumstances. Sandys could gather behind his proposition the support not 
only of those, like him, directly interested in the Virginian tobacco trade, but also of a myriad of other 
pressure groups: the Spanish merchants, bothered as they were by the interloping activities of English 
domestic retailers in the Spanish tobacco market; those engaged in the burgeoning anti-monopoly 
front, who sought to bring down the patent for exclusive tobacco importation; anti-Spanish religious 
and political feelings in general, who clang eagerly to any opportunity to inflict damage on the great 
catholic  king.  Moreover,  the  whole  subject  struck  a  moral  chord  in  parliament,  who  looked 
reproachfully to the growing tobacco consumption in England as an unequivocal pathway to vice, 
corruption, idleness and riotousness. The fact remains that Sandys chose to frame his petition within 
the context of scarcity of money debates, and, the way things played out, it is really hard to believe it 
would have met with such swift approval had it been introduced otherwise. In 1621, money was a hot 






So, why was money then the object of so much care? The possibilities are numerous, and it 
is difficult to reach any definitive conclusion from what was explicitly brought forward in parliament. 
Some suggestions are there to be found, nevertheless. Sandys himself, in his initial speech on February 
26, summarizes the ill effects to be expected from insufficient monetary supply. His reasoning stresses 
domestic circulation of money and its role in setting in motion the economic wheels of a nation – the 
material  welfare  of  all  classes,  from  agricultural  worker  to  sovereign,  depended  upon  abundant 
monetary flows: 
 
                                                 
26 Cf. CD, 1621, II:213-4; V:263.    
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Let us begin with the poor man whose inheritance is his hands. He hath a pair of looms. 
Now every loom keeps 40 on work. If money want, his hands are tied up and so every one 
of them turned out of their inheritances. Look next to the yeoman and farmer. He breaks all 
covenants and bonds. What, for want of corn. No, but of money. His commodities will yield 
but a small price. And yet he cannot utter them at that low price neither. And if it be so, how 
can he possibly uphold himself. What then will be the case of the gentleman and nobleman. 
If their rents be not paid, how can they support themselves. What likewise shall become of 
the money to pay them [merchants and tradesmen]. Certainly there will be no means to 
supply his Majesty’s weighty affairs (CD, 1621, II:137) 
 
Another rhetorically elaborate praise for the virtues of easy money was offered by Serjeant 
Davies: 
 
I heard a wise man compare the hammers of the Mint in the state unto the pulses in a natural 
body. For as if these beat strongly, it argues health; but if faintly, weakness in the body 
natural.  So  those  others  if  they  keep  beating  argue  wealth,  but  if  seldom,  poverty  and 
weakness in the body politic (CD, 1621, II:137-8) 
 
More  frequently,  though, the beneficial  effects  arising  from  abundant  money  are  simply 
assumed  without  any  extensive  elaboration.  Money  was  said  to  be  the  “measure  of  trade”,  and 
therefore indispensable. One commonly found train of thought argued the need for money inflows 
from an explicitly inflationist perspective. The most eminent voice to advocate this idea was that of 
Coke, who stated that “we cannot live in peace or war without money, which is the measure of all 
things”, because “if it be scarce, all commodities go down” (CD, 1621, V:515; II:138). The inflationist 
standpoint often showed up in connection with farming interests, who sought to keep prices of wool 
and corn at a high level. As mentioned above, Coke was absolutely convinced about the desirability of 
high prices for the former, and he was certainly not alone in that. William Noy believed it was “an 
undeniable thinge that it is best to provide for a great price of wooll” (VI:6). When speaking in favor 
of the bill against importation of Irish cattle – another one of the reasons originally given for the 
scarcity of money – Secretary Calvert went even further, saying that “it is better to live in a deare 
countrie then a cheape, where the dearness proceeds from the plenty of money not from the want of 
commoditie” (V:157). Coke spoke suspiciously about importations of victual, which according to him 
always would be returned in money, and his clue was quickly followed by others: 
 
 If it [forbidding Irish cattle imports] showld make a Dearth it would be noe preiudice as 
long as it causeth a plenty of money whereby wee may better indure a Dearth. The greate 
prizes of things amongst our selves hurts not the State, for it is but a transmutation of money 
from hand to hand (CD, 1621, IV:322-3) 
 
It  was  not  infrequently,  thus,  that  inflows  of  money  were  considered  to  be  even  more 
important that those of prime necessity goods, and one of the reasons was that high price levels in the 
kingdom  were  thought  of  as  a  road  to  prosperity.  The  mechanism  behind  such  an  assumption,    
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however,  was  never  stated  in  any  explicit  way.  Seeking  to  reinforce  his  case,  Coke  invoked  the 
authority of former Lord Chief Justice Popham, to whom an abatement of twelve pence in the price of 
a tod of wool would represent a yearly loss of 100,000l. to England
27. But that merely begs the 
question, for it does not explain why such a commercial “overbalance” would be worth pursuing. One 
possible way of making sense of statements like this is to think of them as an appeal for terms of trade 
more favorable to England. Selling dearer and buying cheaper would thus be a means of acquiring a 
larger mass of international purchasing power. Why should this surplus wealth be carried into the 
nation in the form of money is as question to which no clear answer was here provided. The best clue 
to it is the frequent association among plentiful money, high prices and the nation’s general economic 
prosperity – although the second link in this chain was being more and more questioned at this very 
time as a serious hindrance to England’s foreign trade, a point to which I will return briefly. 
Since the beneficial effects of easy money, as the necessary lubricant of economic activities, 
were taken for granted by everyone, the inquiry naturally turned upon how to stop the bleeding. 
Proposed  remedies,  unlike  money,  were  plentiful  in  1621.  As  already  explained,  the  possible 
connection between scarce money and the cloth trade crisis was not accepted by everyone, and several 
voices came forward who believed strictly monetary phenomena were responsible for the shortage of 
metal in circulation. Four of the reasons listed by Cranfield in his preliminary report can be thus 
classified: unequal proportion between gold and silver, high rate of the Mint, prohibition of foreign 
coin, and foreign coin being of low value (CD, 1621, IV:149-50). These ideas had appeared previously 
during the debates, and would frequently be voiced from then on. What they have in common is the 
implicit  argument  that  the  scarcity  of  money  was  occasioned  by  imbalances  generated  on  the 
international money market, independently of any trade processes. Of course, this line of reasoning 
was seldom presented in so clear-cut and unequivocal manner, being frequently mixed with other 
complementary and even contradictory arguments. 
A fine example of such eclecticism of ideas is offered by Coke, who reproached domestic 
consumption  of  money  in  the  form  of  plate,  leaf  and  thread,  excessive  importation  of  foreign 
commodities, and crown-sanctioned silver exports by the East India Company. But he also noted that 
there was “no due proportion between silver and gold, and if silver be undervalued the merchant will 
export it” (CD, 1621, II:138-9). The higher valuation of gold in terms of silver in the English mint, in 
comparison with that offered by other mints abroad, was indeed a problem at that time, inducing 
chronic inflows of gold and outflows of silver. The issue was accordingly raised on several occasions, 
sometimes by people who were more willing than Coke to confer upon it a predominant role in 
explaining the scarcity of money. 
When merchant companies were called to attend the committee for trade on March 21, the 
East India Company representative seized the opportunity to try and divert the focus from his group, 
whose  license  to  export  silver  was  under  heavy  fire  in  parliament.  His  speech  thus  emphasized 
monetary  mechanisms  and  the  possibility  of  re-exporting  East  India  commodities,  and  he  duly 
informed the Commons that “Gold hath not a ratable price with silver in the Indies nor in Spain with 
the Royalls, our silver” (CD, 1621, III:49). In fact, supporters of the East India Company proved to be 
the  staunchest  advocates  of  the  primacy  of  monetary  mechanisms  behind  the  bullion  crisis.  Sir 
                                                 
27 Cf. CD, 1621, II:76-7; V:456-7.    
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Thomas Roe, for instance, argued that in order to stop the money outflow it would be necessary “to 
keepe a proporcion in the value of gold and silver”, because otherwise “silver will goe out to bring in 
gold” (CD, 1621, V:517). This stress on the inadequate rate between gold and silver in the English 
mint was frequently voiced side by side with another essentially monetary argument, which blamed 
the reduced rate of silver coinage offered by the mint for the difficulty in attracting foreign bullion
28. 
Roe himself, shortly thereafter, brought the two ideas together when he cited the following as causes 
of the scarcity: 
 
The difference of the Standerd not only twixt England and Spayne. The disproporcion twixt 
gold and Silver ore. A disproporcion in Silver. Let a man looke wher he can find, Edward 
and Elysa[beth]. The piece of 8 worth at 5s., at Ligorne 4s.8d. The valuation in the Mynt 
under all these (CD, 1621, V:526-7) 
 
According to this second line of reasoning, the problem lied in the low rate paid for silver in 
the English mint, for international standards. The Spanish royals of eight – coins with high silver 
content which were widely used in international trade at the time – could be converted abroad into a 
larger amount of money than would be the case if they were brought to England. In other words, the 
English mint coined less money from a given amount of silver than foreign ones, therefore producing 
currency with higher silver content, or “intrinsic value”, but also inhibiting bearers of foreign coins 
from bringing them to the mint for recoinage. It would be more profitable to carry such coins abroad 
to be exchanged at foreign mints, thus prompting a money outflow. This was perceived by Sir Dudley 
Digges, another member of the East India Company circle, who argued that the scarcity “begin with 
Spaine, because the Mint gives not valuation” (CD, 1621, V:517). The mechanism itself was exposed 
clearly during debates on February 26, when one of the suggested causes of scarcity was: 
 
the Loss of the Exchange of Spanish Rials of Eight, not being of equal worth as they are in 
other places, and therefore the Low Valuation of Silver at the Mint, by reason our Standart 
was better than that of foreign parts, was the Reason silver was not imported so as it was in 
other places (CD, 1621, V:491-2) 
 
Representatives  of  the  French  Company,  likewise,  began  their  defense  stating  that  “no 
pollycy can prevent the importation into Spain nor exportation oute of England while the standard is 
inequall” (CD, 1621, III:48-9). The Merchant Adventurers offered an even more specific account, 
blaming  monetary  fluctuations  in  Germany  –  the  Kipper-  und  Wipperzeit  phenomenom  –  for 
increasing uncertainty and resulting in great losses to merchants trading thereof (III:45-6). A similar 
explanation  was  adduced to justify  corn  imports  from  the  Baltic area  (IV:358).  These  arguments 
carried so much weight that Sir Fulke Greville tried to conclude committee debates in the following 
manner: “To bring all questions to an issu. The forreyne Coyne must be raysed in valuation” (V:526). 
There was a discrepancy between the silver content of English coins and their valuation in exchange 
                                                 
28 The argument held a direct relation with actual monetary conditions then prevailing in England. Gold rates in the mint had 
been raised by 10% in 1611, and from then until the mid-1620’s silver coinages were extremely reduced. The situation 
was made even worse when gold rates were reduced in the Netherlands in 1615, bringing yearly silver coinages to an 
insignificant amount. Cf. Gould (1952).    
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against foreign coins, which made it profitable to export money, recoin it abroad, and then bring the 
returns home via exchange: 
 
Inequality of exchange by undervaluynge of our sylver to others, And their over valuynge of 
their sylver to us. The Intrinsike value is the fineness. The extrinsike value is the rate it 
goeth at. 20s. sterling is 33s. Flemish, and e contrario; but in the finest ours is 36s. Remedy: 
to set the exchange right (CD, 1621, V:314) 
 
 Tampering  with  the  silver  coinage,  however,  was  regarded  with  more  than  a  grain  of 
suspicion, as Roe himself realized when he appealed “not to cry up silver, which were a malady 
instead of a remedy” (CD, 1621, V:517). One proposed alternative was to allow foreign coins to 
become current in England. A proclamation then in effect in England forbade domestic circulation of 
foreign  coins  with  a  view  to  stimulate  mint  activities,  and  its  repeal  was  often  enlisted  was  one 
possible remedy to the scarcity. Sir John Walter attacked the problem saying that “Money is not 
imported; for a proclamation that forbids all forreyn Coyne to be current, which was made to bring 
them into the Mynt. For Spayn Royalls of eight, Dollars out of Germany” (V:526). Not everyone 
believed, however, that a simple repeal would be enough to overcome the perverse monetary processes 
which  forced  money  out  of  England.  Greville,  for  instance,  who  was  then  on  his  last  days  as 
Chancellor of the Exchequer, was of opinion that though the pro[c]lamation be taken away, yet the 
undervalew of foraigne coyne here will restrain the bringing it In” (VI:17). 
In sum, whereas the beneficial effects of abundant money were only vaguely implied during 
parliamentary debates in 1621, the reasons behind the current scarcity were extensive and explicitly 
debated. Among them, the opinion that adverse international monetary processes were a predominant 
cause of bullion deficiencies could find many supporters. The theme would be taken up and pursued at 
length by the pamphlet literature in the years to come, becoming one of its trademarks. But yet another 





Apart money, the other major economic concern in the 1621 parliament was the cloth trade, 
and if the virtues of money could be taken for granted, those of the most important branch of English 
foreign trade were even more obvious. The occasional eulogy is there to be found, nonetheless. During 
a  conference  between  Commons  and  Lords  before  the  summer  adjournment,  Digges  stressed  the 
importance of the matter: 
 
Then he compared the state of the kingdom to the liver and heart in the body. The trade of it 
(he  said)  was  as  the  liver,  obstructed  with  Monopolies,  which  therfor  is  going  into  a 
consumption; but hoped that this Parliament wold open it. The Justice of the Land (he said) 
was as the heart, which throwgh the corruption of bribery was very sick, yet doubted not but 
there was balme for it in the Gilead of this Parliament-assembly (CD, 1621, VI:381) 
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Of all blessings to be expected from a flourishing trade, the most commonly mentioned was 
the provision of employment for the lower classes. “Setting the poore aworke”, as the expression went, 
was almost invariably a side effect of any measure that came to be proposed regarding trade. Most 
petitions and acts were framed with this appeal, and it also abounded in parliamentary debates. Giving 
employment to the poor masses seems to be seen as a way of retaining order and avoiding excessive 
charity charges
29. Be that as it may, the trade crisis’ deleterious effects in terms of employment were 
immediately brought to the table when discussions began. The omnipresent Coke believed that “we 
must  uphold  the  clothier  for  he  keeps  the  poor  on  work”  (CD,  1621,  II:77),  whereas  Sandys, 
discussing a bill for reducing poor relief charges, offered the following reason for the great number of 
charity  recipients  then  in  England:  “The  cause  of  this  I  suppose  is  the  Monopolies,  wherby  all 
haveinge  not  libertie  of  trade  all  the  poore  can  not  be  imployed”  (V:113-4).  More  significantly, 
concern with employment eventually led to a favorable attitude towards labor-intensive activities. 
When the patent for the exclusive production of glass with sea coal was under attack in the committee 
for  grievances,  the  patentees  defended  themselves  by  arguing  that  “the  proportion  between  the 
materials and mens labors shewes the good that comms to the Common weale, for the materials are 
not worth 12d. that make a case worth 20s., all the rest goes into mens labors” (III:256). 
Trade had thus to be supported, and the reasons supplied for explaining the crisis were 
numerous. Most of them, nonetheless, addressed a common set of issues: inadequate manufacture of 
cloth in England, due to deceitful practices by wool dealers and poor workmanship; exportation of raw 
materials such as wool and fuller’s earth, without which, it was believed, manufacture of high quality 
cloth abroad was impossible; decreased foreign demand for English cloth, due either to increased 
international  competition  or  adverse  political  circumstances;  excessive  charges  and  impositions; 
restrictive commercial practices by merchant companies, frequently framed as absence of “free trade”; 
and finally, the disruptive consequences of Cockayne’s project. Another set of economic grievances, 
which did not refer to the cloth trade in particular, but to trade in general, focused on the excessive 
consumption of imported commodities, especially those seen as superfluous. These ideas are drawn 
together  by  one  common  thread:  they  all  look  to  the  balance  of  trade  as  an  omen  of  economic 
disruptions. 
There normally is some conceptual confusion when the existence of a favorable-balance-of-
trade doctrine is discussed. The “doctrine” has been sometimes treated as the simple assertion that 
international  trade  imbalances,  under  a  metallic  monetary  system,  need  to  be  covered  by 
countervailing  flows  of  precious  metals.  Framed  like  this, it configures little more  than  a simple 
tautology, which only acquires any significance when coupled with the positive value assigned to 
money inflows. This idea is definitely not a product of the XVII century, having been recognized and 
advocated at least since the later Middle Ages. The only way in which a favorable-balance-of-trade 
doctrine can be seen as emerging in the course of the XVII century, I would argue, is by redefining it 
in more strict terms: as the proposition that the balance of trade is not only the mechanism through 
which money flows among nations, but also the ultimate determinant of international monetary flows. 
This latter idea was forcefully argued by Thomas Mun in England’s Treasure by Foraign Trade, but, 
unlike the former, it was by no means trivial at the time; indeed, Malynes and Misselden spent pages 
and pages debating it, without apparently reaching any conclusion. 
                                                 
29 Cf. CD, 1621, IV:105-6, 275; V:113-4.    
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The balance of trade was often summoned amid parliamentary debates, which testifies to the 
concept’s widespread usage by 1621. The East India Company had recourse to it in order to justify its 
silver exports: “Yf the Balance of Trade be the Rule of Treasure, The Proceede of the India Trade, 
which is 360,000li. yearly (above the mony disbursed) owght to bee soe much treasure yf other trades 
did  not  withdrawe  it”  (CD,  1621,  IV:230).  But  it  is  unusual  to  find  members  assigning  an 
unequivocally predominant place to the balance of trade in their explanations of the crisis. Foreign 
trade imbalances were normally cited alongside a whole array of other issues, as was the case with 
Coke and Glanville. Some did come forward, though, and placed great emphasis on its role as a 
determinant of monetary flows. Before being expelled, Sir Giles Mompesson was one of them, as 
already mentioned above
30. Without a doubt, however, the fiercest adherent to the favorable-balance-
of-trade  doctrine  in  the  Commons  was  Cranfield.  Putting  his  experience  both  as  officer  and  as 
merchant  to  good  use,  he  never  missed  any  opportunity  to  draw  the  house’s  attention  to  the 
unbalanced state of trade, backing his arguments with customs figures, and showing acute awareness 
of  their  rhetorical  force.  Already  during  preliminary  debates  in  the  money  committee,  Cranfield 
moved “to see the customes Bookes, where you will see that which will greive you” (V:517). His 
explanation to the scarcity of money was thus simple and forceful: 
 
the  unequal  balance  of Trade, the  Goods  imported exceeding  those that  were  exported, 
which would appear, and means to satisfy the House, not by discourse but by Record, which 
was by examining the Custom Book, and to see what the Merchants carried out and what 
they brought in. If that which they bring in be of more value that what they carry out, then 
the balance must needs be unequal. Which would appear by Demonstration (CD, 1621, 
V:492) 
 
During preparations for the summer adjournment, Cranfield strove to argue that England’s 
foreign trade was not decayed, since its volume was higher than ever; the problem lay in the quality of 
trade, for “by increase of Trade outward, the Kingdome thrives; but by Excess of Importacion it 
consumes” (CD, 1621, IV:394). Every time the discussion turned in the direction of monetary topics, 
as it did when Roe, Greville, Towerson, and others like-minded spoke, Cranfield hastily intervened to 
correct the course, telling fellow members: “Wee are to assure ourselves that the want of money is 
because trade is sick, and as longe as trade is sick, wee shalbee in want of money” (VI:296). If the 
favorable-balance-of-trade doctrine had one champion in the 1621 parliament, that man was certainly 
Lionel Cranfield
31. 
One last issue deserves to be examined before coming to a conclusion. As already mentioned 
above,  part  of  the  eagerness for  abundant  money  was  related  to  an  inflationist  standpoint,  which 
believed in benefits to be achieved by a nation through high export prices. The acute trade crisis then 
in course brought to light, in parliament, one of the most significant deadlocks to be found in early 
XVII economic reasoning. Although many still believed in the uniqueness of English cloth, a new 
reality  of  increasing  international  competition  in  textile  markets  forced  itself  upon  public 
                                                 
30  See pages 5-6 above. 
31  Extremely  rich  accounts  of  Cranfield’s  career  as  merchant  and  officer,  offered  from  distinct  but 
complementary perspectives, can be found in Tawney (1958) and Prestwich (1966).    
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consciousness. These new conditions included price competition, and the sour lesson that England was 
no longer free to charge whatever it thought fit for its cloth. Many complaints were voiced against the 
excessive  price  of  domestic  textiles,  which  hindered  its  sale  abroad.  But  such  a  perspective  was 
incompatible with that “rock of reason” invoked by Coke to justify high wool prices
32. The trade crisis 
opened a breach between two ultimately irreconcilable perspectives which would prove very difficult 
to close. 
The issue came into sharp relief as a result of attacks against the company-based structure of 
English trade. Most merchant companies came under heavy fire in parliament, as part of a larger 
campaign for eliminating restrictive practices in the commercial sphere. The Merchant Adventures, 
exclusive holders of rights to export white woolen broadcloths, and the East India Company, entitled 
to a quota of silver exports despite the general prohibition, were favorite targets during trade and 
money  debates
33.  The  former,  in  particular,  was  directly  implicated  in  cloth  trade  proceedings, 
counting on its parliamentary supporters and representatives to lift the blame off its shoulders. One 
such situation occurred on November 26, when a petition by the Merchants of the Staple, who wanted 
permission to export woolen cloth to the Adventurers’ privileges, was being discussed. Sir Thomas 
Lowe  spoke  in  the  Adventurers’  favor,  arguing  that  their  company  organization  allowed  them  to 
maintain prices at a high level even when facing adverse conditions – and this he presented as an 
unquestionable virtue. Shortly thereafter, however, William Neale rose and plainly said: “I thinke that 
the keeping up of cloth abroade hinders our trade. For 480,000 cloathes sold for so much are better to 
the Kingdom then 60,000 for the same price” (CD, 1621, III:442-4). The same problem surfaced in 
connection with the bill for free buying and selling of wool: 
 
In making of all lawer, wisdom looks to the eand, which is to rayse wooll, which will rayse 
cloth. Tis good both be at a good price, but not toe high, for that will undoe the Trade as 
well as the pretemitted Custom and imposition, etc., which makes the Hollanders refuse owr 
cloth for the high price (CD, 1621, III:318) 
 
This clumsy attempt to reach a compromise between two mutually exclusive sets of ideas 
only demonstrates the utter intractability of the problem. No satisfactory solution could be found to it 
in  parliament,  as  indeed  in  most  of  early  XVII  century  British  economic  literature,  which  was 
constantly haunted by this ambiguous attitude towards the desirability of a high domestic price level – 
the exception would be, once again, Thomas Mun. 
 
                                                 
32 See above, page 7. 
33 Cf. CD, 1621, IV, 49-50;V:138, 439-40, 524. The charters and books of both companies were called for examination, and 
the attack against the Merchant Adventurers did not go furhter only because James intervened saying that “there have ben 
diverse things between them and me not so fit for yow to see and deale in. Medle not with those things that belong to me 
and the state” (III:157).    
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CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
England’s economic structure had been profoundly shaken along the second decade of the 
seventeenth century, and the unsettling conditions prompted a burst of economic enquiry during the 
parliamentary  meeting  which  took  place  in  1621.  The  nation’s  economic  maladies  were  faced 
vigorously and in earnest, drawing the most varied groups into the debate and inducing prominent 
individuals to voice their opinions. Few definitive results were achieved, it is true, be it in terms of 
policy or doctrinal consensus. However, parliamentary proceedings brought contending ideas to light 
and put them face to face, revealing weaknesses and contradictions, but also fruitful lines of enquiry. 
These very same themes were shortly thereafter taken up and explored by economic pamphleteers, 
whose works represent the essence of early XVII century English economic thought. Parliamentary 
debates in 1621 provide a fundamental blueprint for this whole literature, without which any attempt 
to grasp its meaning would be necessarily faulty.    
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